But...they did it. The Clippers yanked home court advantage right back out of the Spurs' hands with a stirring 114-105 victory on Sunday afternoon, with the two teams set to return to California for game five on Tuesday all square at two games apiece in the series. How did this happen? Let's take a look.
The defensive tone for the Clippers was established on the first possession of the game, when San Antonio worked Kawhi Leonard off a high screen from Tim Duncan in an attempt to get a switch. Leonard overwhelmed L.A. on Friday night, pouring-in a career-high 32 points on torrid 13-18 shooting from the floor. With both Duncan and Tiago Splitter clogging things up at the left elbow, Matt Barnes had to essentially work through a briar patch of bigs just to stay with Leonard as he received the hand-off at the top of the key.
Barnes goes under the pseudo-screen, correctly anticipating that Leonard would drive rather than pull-up for the long-two. J.J. Redick, afraid to leave Danny Green open in the corner, doesn't hedge too far, essentially leaving Barnes on an island against Leonard in the post. As Leonard rises for the turnaround jumper (a shot he's hit a ridiculous 10-of-15 on this season, per NBA.com), Jordan decides to leave Duncan open at the top of the circle in order to help on Kawhi's shot.
Jordan's help proved to be the right move, as he ultimately (somehow) blocked Leonard's jumper, in a play that likely cannot be made by any player in the league not named DeAndre Jordan. He then controlled the rebound and immediately got the ball to Chris Paul, and the Clippers were on the break. Jordan was then rewarded on the other end with an easy alley-oop from Blake Griffin.
The Clippers have a decided athleticism advantage against the Spurs, and it's a good thing they realized this headed into game four. Doc Rivers and his staff took what happened in game three and made a few necessary tweaks that helped get the Clippers right back into the series.
One of the adjustments L.A. made was to get Chris Paul involved early and often. He was a total non-factor in the game three debacle, scoring just seven points on 3-11 shooting. He didn't even attempt a free throw in that game. The Spurs have had more success using Danny Green as his primary defender, though they began this game with Tony Parker checking CP3.
On their second possession of the game, the Clips worked quickly to Paul going. They ran him around a Redick screen on the weak side in order to help him gain quick position in the post with Parker on his back. Upon receiving the entry pass from Barnes, the screen fiesta begins. Barnes immediately screens Griffin's man, Splitter, forcing a switch with Danny Green.
Griffin then sets a down screen on Paul's man, Parker, that Paul uses to free himself near the free-throw line. Now, Chris has options. He can either quickly dump the ball to Griffin, now being guarded by the much smaller Green, or take his favorite midrange jumper, which is now available thanks to Blake taking Parker out. Also, on the weak side, we can see Jordan setting a down screen for J.J. Redick, which would likely set him free at the top of the three-point arc.
Paul chooses the jump shot. As the league's top shooter from midrange per NBA.com (he hit 251-of-507 "midrange shots this year, a cool 49.5%), it seems almost automatic. While dropping the pass to Griffin on the move is never a bad choice, this play is obviously designed specifically to get Paul an open shot from his sweet spot, and he drills it.
On Sunday, the Clippers just seemed to work harder than they had on Friday. They missed a ton of shots Friday (as will happen when you finish a game shooting just 34%), but their work effort on Sunday was far superior than it was on Friday. They worked to get themselves open shots, and they hit them, more often than not. The Clippers shot an absurd 53.6% from the floor in game four.
The only Clipper regular to hit over 50% of his attempts in game three was DeAndre Jordan, who went 5-6 on largely dunks, as usual. Conversely, Paul, Griffin, Jordan, Redick, Glen Davis and Austin Rivers all topped the 50% shooting mark in game four. The Spurs weren't operating at their peak defensively in this game, but a lot of the success can be chalked-up to plain old Clipper effort.
With the aforementioned athleticism advantage, the Clippers obviously like to play the game at a higher pace than the Spurs do, for the most part. Pace factor is the number of possessions a team uses in a game. The pace factor for game three was 89.2, which is quite slow for an NBA game. To compare, game four's pace factor was 95.7. Game one (the first Clipper win) had a pace of 97.2. Game two (the first Spur win) had a pace of 90.9. It's no real coincidence that the Clippers have taken the two faster-paced games, while the Spurs have won the slower ones.
One of the staples of the San Antonio offense is shooting the corner three-pointer. The Spurs made just six of their 25 attempts from deep in game four, though they went 4-of-6 from the corners. We know by now that the Spurs thrive using off-ball motion and ball-movement better than anyone else in the league, and that's largely why they're able to get tons of shots they want, such as corner three balls. Even plays that appear to be broken plays seem to wind up with the Spurs getting a favorable look quite often.
San Antonio has the clear depth advantage over the Clips, as their bench is loaded with specialty types that are still able to run the offense quite well. The Spurs began the second quarter with Danny Green and Tiago Splitter as the only starters on the floor, alongside Patty Mills, Marco Belinelli and Manu Ginobili. This is a tiny lineup, with Belinelli essentially operating as the "power forward". But the Clippers were using a super small lineup as well, featuring Davis, Redick, Rivers, Jamal Crawford and Hedo Turkoglu. This is a five-man lineup that the Clippers have rarely used all year, but it's safe to say it's one that will struggle defensively, even when facing opposing bench units.
But again, the bench guys are fully capable of keeping the Spurs' offense whirring. This play is a perfect indicator, even if it results in a missed shot.
Off a defensive rebound, Patty Mills gets the ball to Ginobili above-the-arc. Upon delivering the pass, Mills then zips into the right corner that had been previously occupied by Belinelli. Belinelli then shuffles into the left corner. Green, who was previously in the left corner, then moves to the left wing. All the while, Splitter is setting a screen for Ginobili at the top, forcing Davis to switch onto Manu.
Manu speeds around Splitter's pick, leaving the surprisingly nimble-footed Big Baby alone to face him on the right wing. The three Clips not involved in the play, Rivers, Crawford and Turk, are all well aware that their big buddy is faced with the terrifying task of staying in front of Ginobili away from the basket. They're all prepared to help.
As Ginobili moves around the screen, he catches Mills' man, Austin Rivers, napping, and whips a bounce pass right to Mills on the baseline as he back-cuts Rivers to death. Turkoglu is then forced to help cut-off Mills' easy path to the basket, leaving Belinelli wide open in the corner. Crawford left Danny Green wide open on the wing in order to take Splitter, who set the screen to free-up Manu initially. Turk's help on Mills was necessary, but Crawford's help on Splitter was a result of Davis and Redick overplaying the screen in the first place. Green shouldn't be this wide open, but he is. Upon receiving the ball, Mills has a trio of options: try and score at the bucket over Turkoglu's help, or dish it to either Belinelli or Green, both of whom are open from three.
He chooses Green, who himself has a pair of options. He can either take the three, which he does, or make the extra pass to Belinelli in the corner. Belinelli was exactly 12-of-27 from both corners this season, a cool 44.4%. Green takes the three from above-the-break (where the three-point line begins to arc); a shot he connected on 39% of the time during the regular season. So, there was no real wrong option here, despite Green missing the attempt in the end.
The scary thing about this is that there wasn't much of anything the Clippers did wrong on that possession. But the one huge mistake was Rivers letting Mills get the baseline on him, which opened up the rest of the play. The Spurs typically make you pay dearly for mistakes like these, but can also be so precise in executing their gameplan that you're helpless to defend it even if you are prepared.
This next play is a work of art we've come to expect from the Spurs, and it's also an example of how lethal they can be even if you limit your own defensive mistakes.
The set begins with Duncan and Leonard flanking each other on the blocks, with Green set-up on the left wing. Boris Diaw sprints (at least as well as Boris Diaw can sprint" down and immediately sets a screen for Leonard, who flashes up and receives a pass at the top of the arc from Patty Mills.
Green now moves to a position right behind Duncan on the left block.
After dishing to Kawhi, Mills then dashes down toward the baseline and through the paint, all the way to the left wing, with Green screening Mills' man, Jamal Crawford, along the way. Once Mills flashes open on the left wing, Leonard finds him with a pass. Meanwhile, as Mills was breaking free, Green was subsequently using a screen from Diaw to free himself on the right wing. Leonard finds Mills on the left wing before Mills immediately whips a skip-pass to Green on the right side.
Green then enters the ball to Diaw in the post. At the very second Diaw touches the ball, Mills dashes into the left corner as Duncan springs to life and sets a screen on Mills' man, Crawford. Diaw whips a pass directly to the now-freed Mills in the corner, where he drills a three.
The only real thing the Clippers might have been able to do better here was have Glen Davis spring out to cover Mills in the corner, but he was too slow to react to what was happening, and wasn't even looking at Duncan screening Crawford. Also, having Glen Davis "spring" into any sort of movement isn't something that's going to be happening, anyway.
The Clippers did a good job in limiting the attack of the Spurs on Sunday, but we know that Gregg Popovich is the master of adjustments. Also, the master of pretty much everything else. He'll have his guys more ready to play on Tuesday than they were on Sunday, and it'll be on Rivers and his staff to make sure the Clips are able to match that.
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